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COMPETITIVE BIDDING IN THE COURTHOUSE:
IN RE ORACLE SECURITIES LITIGATION*
"How would you feel if you were on top of a thing built by the
lowest bidder on the government contract?"

INTRODUCTION
When confronted with numerous shareholders filing suit
against the Oracle Systems Corporation, a district court judge
in the Northern District of California brought down the gavel
upon the litigants in total disgust at what the court perceived
to be an unethical feeding frenzy. In In re Oracle Securities
Litigation,2 Judge Vaughn Walker refused to accept a nomination made by the shareholders' attorneys to appoint two of the
firms as co-lead counsel. Instead, Judge Walker ordered firms
interested in acting as lead counsel to bid for the position?
With that seemingly simple order, Judge Walker banished the
familiar system of attorney compensation in common fund
litigation and instituted a contractual bidding war.
The issue of attorney compensation is taken very seriously
by the legal profession. The public is suspicious of lawyers
generally and jealous of the fees they command specifically.
This suspicion is partially exacerbated by the development of
class action suits litigated on a contingency fee basis. As one
court phrased it, "A lawsuit is a fruit tree planted in a lawyer's
garden."4 But Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

* This Comment discusses four published opinions arising out of the Oracle
Systems Corporation shareholders' litigation: 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
[hereinafter Oracle 1];132 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1990) [hereinafter Oracle II]; 136
F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Cal. 1991) [hereinafter Oracle III]; 829 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Cal.
1993) [hereinafter Oracle IV.
1 John Noble Wilford, Space Exploration from Chapter One, N.Y. TIMES, May
5, 1985, at 25 (quoting John Glenn's remarks on his experience as an astronaut in
Spaceflight (PBS television documentary, May 8, 1985)).
2 Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
Id. at 691.
City of Detroit v. Grinnell, 495 F.2d 448, 469 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting an
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expressly grants a court authority to certify large classes,5 and
large classes often receive large awards from guilty defendants.
In turn, a large fee is earned by the attorney representing the
class. In reality, however, class actions constitute less than .6%
of all cases filed in the federal court system and, on the average, class action plaintiffs' attorneys received only 14.7% of the
6.4 billion dollars that plaintiffs recovered in class action suits
over the past twenty years.6
The negative attitude toward class action suits is more
prevalent in securities-related litigation like Oracle Securities
Litigation. Since the stock market crash of 1987, class action
suits brought by corporate shareholders have been on the
rise. 7 Less tolerant of a corporation's faulty predictions, investors no longer wait for the tide to turn. Instead, they allege
that a hopeful, but mistaken, prediction about the way stock
will perform is a false and misleading statement of material
fact in violation of federal securities law.8 These apparently

Italian proverb); see also In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,160, 90,870-82 n.6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 1990) (noting
rising concern among courts and commentators over attorney fees in class action
suits); Richard M. Birnholz, Comment, The Validity and Propriety of Contingent
Fee Controls, 37 UCLA L. REv. 949 (1990) (owing to the concern that lawyers
charge too much, some states like California have proposed legislation to limit the
percentage of an award that lawyers can earn in a tort claim brought on a contingency fee basis); Kurt Eichenwald, Millions for Us, Pennies for You, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 1993, § 3, at 1, 12 (discussing disillusionment of limited partnership investors who discovered the "troubling truth" that in litigating their claims of fraud
against the partnership, lawyers were the only winners).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
6 Beverly C. Moore, Going Once, Going Twice: Bidding for Work, LEGAL TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1990, at 27.
" In 1987, 108 securities class actions were filed. William S. Lerach, Securities Class Actions and Derivative Litigation Involving Public Companies, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1990, at 106 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 399, 1990). This number rose to 315 filings in 1990. Moore, supra, note
6 at 27; see also Ross Kerber, Shareholder Suits Prompt Reform Push, WASH.
POST, Aug. 8, 1993, at Hi (citing Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") as
authority for statistic that shareholder suits have tripled since 1988).
' In a recent hearing before a Senate subcommittee, corporate executives
claimed that any 10% drop in the price of their stock results in the filing of a
lawsuit. Senate Panel Hears Views on Reducing Number of Frivolous 10b-5 Actions,
DAILY REP. FOR ExEcuTivEs, June 18, 1993, at A116; see also Christopher Byron,
House of Cards: The Fall of American Express's James D. Robinson III, NEW
YORK, Feb. 15, 1993, at 30 (quoting Joseph Flom, a mergers and acquisitions attorney at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, who predicted an increase in
suits brought by unhappy investors).
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vexatious suits, or "strike suits," are naturally disfavored by
courts as a "particularly repugnant series of blackmail" in
which shareholders mask vying for corporate control in drawnout lawsuits that waste the resources of courts and corporations and usually result in settlements.9 As then-Justice
Rehnquist noted, the "mere existence of an unresolved lawsuit"
is potentially of great value to plaintiff-shareholders since the

threat of such suits disturbs day-to-day corporate affairs at

great expense to the company. ° Despite the bias against securities litigation, a countervailing policy forces courts to take
such litigation seriously. An over-worked Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") does not possess the resources to
police every violation of its rules." Shareholders were granted
the right to bring private actions for damages under the securities laws not so much to compensate the shareholder, but rather "to promote enforcement of the Act and to deter negligence
2
by providing a penalty for those who fail in their duties."
Therefore, shareholders are encouraged to bring suit when a
violation of the securities laws has occurred.
In securities litigation, attorneys representing the class
receive part of the total award as compensation for their efforts. That plaintiffs do not reimburse their attorneys out of
their own pockets is not due to a congressional fee-shifting
statute designed to promote private attorneys-general who
assist the government in prosecuting securities violators."
Brown v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 96 F.R.D. 64, 67 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
see
10 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741-43 (1975);
that
intent
the
(discussing
371
also Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) operate as a bar to "strike suits" by requiring a complaint to be verified under oath).
" See, e.g., Watchdog Woes, Up Against It at the SEC, BUS. WK., Oct. 10,
1988, at 120 (SEC declined to investigate controversial case due to lack of resources); Inundated Agency: Busy SEC Must Let Many Cases and Filings Go
Uninvestigated, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1985, at 1 (quoting Chairman of SEC as
noting that the agency is not the only recourse against serious violations).
12 Globas v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287 (2d Cir. 1969). Courts
acknowledge that the function of securities-related lawsuits and corresponding fee
awards is to promote enforcement of federal securities law. See Fortner Enters.,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969); In re Public Serv. Co.
of New Mexico, No. 91-0536M, 1992 WL 278452, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 28, 1992).
See generally Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (establishing four factors to determine implied right of action under federal statutes); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964) (recognizing implied right of action under section 14(a) of the 1934
Act).
" In fee shifting statutes, Congress "explicit[ly] provi[des] for the allowance of
'
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Rather, the compensation scheme is a function of an equitable
doctrine called the "common fund" theory. The common fund
theory embraces the principle that one who has created a benefit for a class of persons should be reimbursed for her efforts.
Although individual shareholder-plaintiffs may contract with
counsel for the amount of compensation before the litigation,
after a class is certified, most retainer agreements provide that
any reference to fees in the contract will be void since the court
will set the fee at the end of litigation.14 A court will then
compute compensation on the basis of a "lodestar" calculation15 or simply award counsel a percentage of the award.
The Northern District of California and the Ninth Circuit
are particularly plagued by securities litigation, as they serve
litigants from "Silicon Valley," the Northern California home to
numerous computer software companies. 6 Indeed, it is quite
attorneys' fees under selected statutes granting or protecting various federal
rights" on the theory that an attorney who pursues these actions has acted as a
private attorney general. Thus, the obligation to pay for the services of plaintiffs
counsel is "shifted" from plaintiff to defendant. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 210, 260-61 n.33 (1975) (listing federal legislation that
permits fee shifting). Alternatively, the common fund theory is a judicially created
doctrine under which attorneys' fees come directly out of the plaintiffs award. For
further discussion of common fund theory, see infra notes 24-34 and accompanying
text.
14 See infra text accompanying note 19.
1 The lodestar approach is a method by which attorneys in class action suits
are awarded their fees at the termination of the litigation. An hourly fee figure
(either the attorney's normal fee or a fee based on community standards) is multiplied by the number of reasonable hours the attorney spent on the litigation. The
resulting sum is then often subject to increase (or "enhancement") or decrease in
the form of a multiplier which depends, among other factors, on the risky nature
of the lawsuit. For example, if a court determined that an hourly fee award was
$200 and that counsel reasonably spent 200 hours on a case, the sum of $40,000
may be multiplied by 1.8 if that case were particularly risky, resulting in a fee
award of $72,000. For further discussion of the lodestar approach, see infra notes
35-47 and accompanying text.
16 Silicon Valley, the popular name for Santa Clara County, California, is the
"hotbed" of American entrepreneurial technology. Now the "center of the technology
world," many recently have predicted its demise. Scott Brown, How Gray is My
Valley, TIME, Nov. 18, 1991, at 90, 91; Peter Dworkin, The Graying of Silicon
Valley, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 2, 1989, at 44 (arguing that despite Silicon
Valley's lead in innovative systems, it is in decline due to mergers and Wall
Street disenchantment); Michelle Quinn, Job Crunch: The Slamming Doors of Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1994, at F5 (noting the elimination of jobs by the
Silicon Valley computer industry due to decline of defense contracts and general
cautious atmosphere); see also Tom Bethel, California, Here I Come, NAT'L REV.,
Feb. 27, 1987, at 33, 34-35 (explaining that Silicon Valley extends from Stanford
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apparent from recent cases that Ninth Circuit courts are disgruntled by the predictably wasteful type of lawsuit that typically arises there. In 1989, Judge Patel of the Northern District of California described the "all too familiar path of large
securities cases" 7 in the Ninth Circuit:
[The case] was filed as a class action by a number of well-recognized
lawyers who specialize in plaintiffs' securities litigation. The complaint named the usual cast of defendants-the corporation... ; the
officers and directors; the underwriters [and] the corporation's accountants.... Various defendants moved to dismiss and the case
moved lugubriously through the pleadings phase. Discovery assumed
its usual massive proportions, and finally, as the case wound down
toward trial, settlement negotiations became serious and were aggressively pursued. On the eve of trial, after the parties had expended significant attorneys' time and hence, accumulated the routinely
18
anticipated hours and fees, the case was settled.

Given this setting, it is hardly surprising that Judge Walker
reacted with such vehemence to yet another fee petition.
This Comment examines the competitive bid approach that
Judge Walker fashioned in In re Oracle Securities Litigation to
respond to the dissatisfaction with the current methods of
attorney compensation. In an effort to place Judge Walker's
decision in context, Part I of this Comment first gives an overview of a securities class action and the manner in which lead
counsel typically is chosen. Next, it addresses the common
fund doctrine, the method that permits attorneys to have their
fees deducted from the plaintiffs' award in securities class-

to San Jose and that some of its computer companies, including Apple, are slowly
moving to less expensive quarters); Manieet Kripalani, The Decline of Silicon Valley, FoRBES, May 25, 1992, at 114 (explaining area's loss of young entrepreneurs
to Colorado due to high cost of living in Santa Clara County); The SEC has even
targeted the area's companies, since, as SEC director of the San Francisco office,
Gladwyn Goins, explained, young corporations may succumb to the "temptation to
misstate" their financial prospects in an effort to secure market positions. New
SEC Head Targets Silicon Valley's Freewheeling Ways, PC WK., Feb. 27, 1989, at
64. But see Kerber, supra, note 7, at HI (former director of SEC, district judge
Stanley Sporkin, noted before Senate subcommittee that while many companies deserve litigation, high-tech companies are particularly vulnerable to litigation due to
stock prices fluctuating in response to scientific developments).
17 In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
1' Id. Ken Siegmann, Apple Verdict Stuns Lawyers, SAN FRAN. CHRON., June 1,
1991, at BI (quoting attorney for Apple Computer Inc. as claiming that
"[elverytime there's an earnings disappointment in Silicon Valley, someone claims
they've been defrauded").
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action litigation. Part I then discusses the two methods by
which counsel is compensated under the common fund doctrine. Judge Walker eschewed those traditional methods-lodestar and benchmark percentages-in favor of a third
method: competitive bidding. Part II next describes the Oracle
court's three opinions concerning the bidding method-the
order for bids, the review and selection of the bids received and
an order denying a motion to set aside the winning bid. Finally, Part III analyzes the Oracle approach and similar approaches proposed by commentators to determine the efficacy
of these approaches. This Comment concludes that while bidding may not be the perfect solution, it is indeed a viable option that, with some tinkering, should be considered by other
courts in future common fund cases.
I. BACKGROUND

A. An Overview of a Securities Class Action
Typically, a securities class action suit like Oracle begins
once a shareholder has filed suit in federal court claiming that
the corporation in which she holds stock, its individual directors and its accountants have violated federal securities law.
Most likely, that shareholder has retained an attorney to prepare this claim. The shareholder and attorney probably have
signed a retainer agreement in which the attorney agrees to
forego compensation until the end of the litigation, or takes a
small fee in exchange for a promise by the shareholder that
the attorney will receive a certain portion of the shareholder's
award. This retainer contract is called a contingency fee agreement.' 9
This shareholder probably is not the only one filing suit.
W

Many retainer contracts provide such a provision:

The CLIENT understands that the LAW FIRM will file a suit on his behalf
and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons against the Defendants. If a court determines that the client's case should proceed as a
class action, the LAW FIRM's fee for professional services rendered will be
set by the court hearing the case. In no event, however, will the fee
charged for the CLIENT exceed thirty-three and one-third (33 1/3%) per
cent of the amount recovered on CLIENT's behalf.
In re Financial Partners Class Action Litig., No. 82C5910, 1986 WL 8037, at *1
(N.D. Ill. July 5, 1986).
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There are usually several plaintiffs represented by several
attorneys filing exactly the same claim in the same courthouse.
For reasons of expediency, both the court and the parties will
want to consolidate these suits into one action. If the parties
consist of shareholders all claiming the same injury, the court
will receive and grant a motion to certify a class. The single
plaintiff-shareholder's individual lawsuit has now become part
of a larger class action suit.2 °
At this point, the court and the parties will likely agree
that one firm be assigned the role of lead counsel, as it would
be ludicrous to permit all the individual shareholders' attorneys to speak with anything but one voice before the court.
That one voice is embodied in the lead or a team of co-lead
counsel. Lead counsel is commonly nominated at a meeting of
the shareholder-plaintiffs' attorneys. The court then formally
appoints the nominated firm. 21
" See, e.g., Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 762-63 (9th Cir.
1977) (describing the manner in which the various plaintiffs' suits were filed, consolidated and certified for a class action).
21 There are no federal procedural rules that directly pertain to the manner in
which lead counsel should be chosen out of a group of plaintiffs' attorneys. Nonetheless, the process is common and usually conducted by the attorneys themselves.
The Manual for Complex Litigation is generally referred to during this process. It
lead counsel . . . ha[s] proven to be
notes that "uifn complex . . . litigation ...
unusually efficient in pretrial proceedings" and is "usually chosen by the groups of
parties having a common interest." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.92 (5th
ed. 1982). It further suggests that "the court should not, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, select and appoint lead counsel" itself. Rather, the court
should encourage and request the use of lead counsel. If the attorneys fail to follow the request, according to the Manual, then the court may take it upon itself
to appoint lead counsel of its choice. Id.
The issue of lead counsel first appeared in MacAlister v. Guterman, 263 F.2d
65, 69 (2d Cir. 1958). In that case, a district court questioned its own authority to
appoint general counsel for plaintiffs at the request of the defendant. While agreeing with the lower court that such an appointment would be inappropriate in this
case, the Second Circuit found that it is within a court's discretion. Id. at 70.
Because a court has inherent authority to control its docket, and under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) a court may consolidate actions and "make such orders . . . as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delays," a ruling that limits
duplicative practice by the parties was within the authority of the court. Id. at 69;
Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing both
MacAlister and the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION as authority for court's
power to appoint lead counsel and to restrict the role of non-lead counsel); In re
Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) is liberally applied to endow the court with
"strong" and "flexible" managerial powers); 2 HERBERT B. NEWBURG, NEWBURG ON
CLASS ACTIONS §§ 9.34, 9.35 (2d ed. 1985) (citing the Manual as authority for
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Motions, discovery and trial or settlement then ensue. If
the case results in any benefit to the class of shareholders, the
judgment amount is deposited with the court,22 which will
have to address the method of compensating the attorneys who
litigated the action. Counsel will be entitled to reimbursement
under the common fund doctrine, by which they will take their
fees out of the plaintiffs' award. The court will determine the
amount of fees to which counsel are entitled according to the
lodestar or percentage methods. Usually, these approaches will
not conflict with the retainer agreements signed by the plaintiffs and their attorneys because those contracts contain clauses by which the parties agree that if the case proceeds as a
class action, the court hearing the case will set the fee for
services renderedY
B. The Common Fund Doctrine
Although the "American rule" generally prohibits the winning attorney in a lawsuit from recovering an attorney's fee
from the defendant or award, one exception to this is when a
common fund is created in the court.24 The Supreme Court
delineated this exception as early as 1881 in Trustees v.
GreenoughY A bondholder, Vose, had diligently pursued an
action against a group of trustees for waste in their control

court's power to appoint lead counsel, but acknowledging that power only in extraordinary circumstances, such as the parties' failure to do so themselves); see
also In re Ivan F. Boesky Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 1358, 1364 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
that lead counsel has broad authority which includes power to negotiate settlements).
In Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 476 (1980), for example, the
lower court ordered the defendant to deposit the judgment into an escrow account
and appointed a Special Master to administer the funds. No such appointment has
been made in the Oracle litigation.
' See supra note 19 and accompanying text. If the parties have failed to use
this clause, the court will assess the fee for lead counsel out of the plaintiffs'
portion. In re Air Crash, 549 F.2d at 1019 (noting that the court failed to have
the award paid into the court and assessing reimbursements for lead counsel
against the retained lawyers).
24 A fund created in the court may take many forms: a trust administered by
a court, a decedent's estate or a judgment award paid by defendants that passes
through the court to be distributed to plaintiffs. In re Air Crash, 549 F.2d at
1018; Edmund Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from
Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1618 (1974).
25 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
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over property in which the plaintiff and other bondholders held
equity interests. The suit was decided in favor of the bondholders, and Vose, who had borne most of the expense of the litigation, petitioned the trial court for reimbursement.26 The Court
affirmed the granting of the petition, holding that one who acts
as a trustee in relation to the common interest is entitled to
reimbursement from those who receive the benefits of the fund
created in court. The Court found that charging the fund is the
most expedient and equitable way of insuring contribution
from all those who benefit therefrom."
In Central Railroad & Banking Co. of Georgia v. Pettus,
the Supreme Court in 1884 expanded this doctrine. It permitted the attorney who had counseled a plaintiff in an action
that created a common fund to bring a motion for reimbursement, thereby eliminating the need for involvement of the
plaintiff at that stage.2" The Supreme Court reaffirmed the
vitality of the common fund doctrine in 1939, finding that a
plaintiff need not even bring suit as a class representative for
an attorney to receive payment from a common friend.29 All
that need occur is the establishment of a common fund that
benefits a group due to the efforts of the complainant.
In 1970, the Supreme Court applied the common fund
principle to award attorneys' fees to successful shareholders
suing under section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 ("1934 Act") and SEC Rule 14a-9 in Mills v. Electric Auto
Lite Co."0 The Mills court found nothing in the 1934 Act to
"deny] courts the power to award" fees, even though the 1934
Act did not expressly authorize fees. 3 ' The Court also ac-

knowledged the plaintiffs' right to reimbursement even if the

" Id. at

529.

2"

Id. at 532.

2

Central R.R. & Banking Co. of Georgia v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1884).

Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
3 396 U.S. 375 (1970). The Mills case is more commonly known for another

aspect of its holding, that a sufficient causal relationship exists between a materially misleading proxy statement and merger merely by virtue of the fact that the
merger was accomplished through the deficient proxy statement. The holding dis-

pensed with a requirement that a shareholder-plaintiff claiming fraud has a burden of proving that she actually relied on the misleading proxy in approving the
merger.
1 Id. at 390 (citing Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.

1943)).
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suit produced no monetary recovery. As long as the class was
benefitted by the suit-for example, if the market value of
their shares increased-a court could assess fees against the
defendant. 2
Similarly, the Oracle litigation involved assertions of injury to the class due to violations of federal securities law. Accordingly, under the common fund theory, Judge Walker faced
the probability that the attorneys before the court would be
entitled to fees out of their clients' award. In any common fund
case, compensation to the attorneys must be reasonable. 33 Before the Oracle decisions, lodestar and percentage calculations
were the only two methods by which courts computed that
reasonable fee.34
C. Lodestar
The lodestar approach was first formulated in the Third
Circuit upon a petition for attorneys' fees in an antitrust litigation settlement. 35 The court in Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.38 set forth the
principle that a court, in order to "compensate the attorney for
the reasonable value of services," must begin by ascertaining
the number of hours spent on the case. The court then must
value the services by fixing a reasonable hourly rate for the
attorney's time. That hourly rate is multiplied by the number
of hours to arrive at a basis for the valuation, which is the
"lodestar" of the court's fee determination.3 8 The court can

2 Thus, in a suit such as Oracle, attorneys would still receive their fees even
if the plaintiffs did not receive a monetary award.
's See, e.g., Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 452, 545 (10th Cir.
1988) (requiring that the lower courts "articulate specific reasons for fee awards").
" In re Capital Underwriters, Inc. Sec. Litig., 519 F. Supp. 92, 98 (9th Cir.
1981) (noting that "several approaches" are used to calculate attorneys' fees in
common fund cases, but these include variations on the lodestar method in addition to the percentage approach).
" Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). The attorneys in Lindy were not entitled to fees
under the Clayton Act (by which the plaintiffs were entitled to relief), but rather,
as in the Oracle litigation, under a common fund doctrine. See id. at 164-65.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 167.
" A "lodestar," by definition, is a guiding light or principle. AMERICAN HERI-

TAGE DICTIONARY 739 (2d ed. 1991).
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then adjust the lodestar after considering the contingent nature of success (as it appeared at the onset of the litigation)
and the quality of the work performed. 9
The Supreme Court, however, made the practice of adjusting the lodestar questionable in two recent decisions. In Blum
v. Stenson, the Court addressed the fee petitions of three attorneys from the Legal Aid Society of New York, who had represented a class of Medicaid recipients.4" Counsel was entitled
to fees under 42 U.S.C. section 1988, but the Department of
Social Services opposed the fee petitions, because plaintiffs'
counsel had requested a fifty percent increase above a "pure"
lodestar calculation. 41 Justice Powell made clear that no enhancement could be awarded in statutory fee-shifting cases on
the basis of attorney skill or the complexity or novelty of the
issues, because the latter was reflected in the number of billable hours and the former in the hourly rate.
3' 487 F.2d at 167-69. Although the Lindy court did not prescribe a specific
method by which to adjust the lodestar, it is commonly adjusted by multiplying
the lodestar by some figure (a "multiplier" or an "enhancer") meant to represent
the corresponding risk and quality of skill or the lack of these elements. Multipliers are "notoriously inconsistent, ranging anywhere from zero to four." Monique
Lapointe, Note, Attorney's Fees, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 858 (1991). For instance,
in In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 1987), the
district court awarded multipliers of 1.5 to most of the various attorneys requesting fees, but enhanced six attorneys' fees by a multiplier of 1.75 for their exceptional skill.
A typical lodestar computation can be found in Feuerstein v. Burns, 569 F.
Supp. 268 (S.D. Cal. 1983). In Feuerstein, the court was presented with a fee
petition requesting payment for 3850 hours of work valued by the firm at
$423,000.00 including a multiplier of 1.09 to account for risk. Id. at 270. The court
refigured the computation, using the firm's average billing rate to arrive at a
lodestar of $224,500.00, which it then multiplied by 1.09 to arrive at a total compensation to the firm of $244,705.00. Id. at 275-76.
A variant of the Lindy lodestar method was adopted by the Fifth and Ninth
circuits pursuant to the Fifth circuit decision in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). The factors articulated by the Johnson court,
like the Lindy considerations, include time and reasonableness of the fee, in addition to other factors: novelty and difficulty of issues; necessary skill; counsel's
inability to accept other employment; whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
whether the suit had to be given priority over other work; the relief granted; the
experience and reputation of counsel; the undesirability of handling the case;
counsel's relationship with the client; and awards in similar litigation. Id. at 71719. The Ninth Circuit adopted the Johnson factors in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild,
526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975).
4 465 U.S. 886, 889 (1984).
at 890-91. A "pure" lodestar calculation is simply the amount of hours
" Id.
worked multiplied by the firm's billing rate.
42 Blum was not the first time a federal court had questioned the propriety of
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In a plurality decision three years later, the Court further
questioned the practice of enhancing a lodestar calculation in a
statutory fee-shifting case in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens' Council for Clean Air ("Delaware Valley IF)." A majority of the Court agreed that risk was an unacceptable factor
to consider when determining the applicability of enhancement
in a case where attorneys' fees were awarded on the basis of a
fee-shifting statute. The Court noted the many undesirable
effects of adjusting the lodestar upwards: since it awards parties with the least chance of success, such an adjustment penalizes the defendant with the strongest defense; enhancement
figures or "multipliers" have no genuine mathematical base;
the promise of enhancement creates a "conflict of interest"
between the attorney and client by forcing the attorney to
divulge the weakness of the case while obliging a losing defendant to address the strengths of plaintiffs case to debate the
fee award; adjustments force the court to assess the risks of
the case under the fiction that the outcome is unknown; and
enhancement cannot serve its purported purpose of inducing
competent counsel to take cases since counsel cannot predict
whether one will be used or not.' Neither Blum nor Delaware
Valley II explicitly provide a bar to the use of multipliers in
common fund suits that do not involve compensation under feeshifting statutes. Nonetheless, these decisions have caused
many to question whether the Supreme Court would dismiss
the use of a multiplier under any circumstance.4 5

a multiplier. Three years earlier, the Northern District of California had refused to
increase a lodestar calculation for quality of performance because it felt that when
a limited fund was involved, as in any common fund action, a court should raise
the lodestar only when attorney performance is extraordinary. In re Capital Underwriters, Inc. Sec. Litig., 519 F. Supp. 92, 102 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
43 483 U.S. 711 (1987) (overturning district court award of fee petition that
doubled the lodestar for three phases of counsel's work because case presented
novel issues and had highly contingent nature of success) [hereinafter Delaware
Valley Ill.
" Id. at 719-21.
41 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 234-36 (2d
Cir. 1987) (finding that Blum and Delaware Valley II severely restrict instances in
which district courts may apply a multiplier and declining to apply a "risk multiplier," but applying multiplier for quality of counsel's work); In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 800 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (acknowledging that Supreme Court has not yet addressed common fund cases, but found the prohibition
relevant to common fund cases, thus rescinding the lower court's enhancement of
lodestar since it "double-count[ed] the value of the counsel's work"); In re Washing-
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Notwithstanding Blum and Delaware Valley II, however,
courts, including those in the Ninth Circuit, continue to employ
a straightforward lodestar approach.4" At the same time, both
commentators and courts have criticized the approach primarily because it can award attorneys for drawing out litigation.4"

ton Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 779 F. Supp. 1056, 1061 (D. Ariz. 1991)
(noting that the Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed multiplier issue); Rothfarb v.
Hambrecht, 649 F. Supp. 183, 199-200 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (applying multiplier for
contingent nature of suit, but not for quality of representation); see also Eddie
Correia, Antitrust Policy after the Reagan Administration, 76 GEO. L.J. 329, 344,
n.50 (acknowledging that the threat of no multiplier is "of great concern to the
plaintiffs bar" and although the defense bar may argue that multipliers are unnecessary, "most likely few of them have ever invested several years in a complex
case with the risk that they might never be paid"); Deborah A. mlar, Attorney's
Fees in Securities Class Actions: Recent Developments under the Common Fund
Doctrine, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1991: STRATEGIES AND CURRENT DEVELOPMIENTS, at 153 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 417,
1991) (noting that recent Supreme Court decisions prohibiting multipliers in feeshifting cases have caused some to question the viability of a multiplier in common fund cases and correspondingly have caused some courts to switch to a percentage approach); Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys' Fees in
Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 656 (1992) (noting that Delaware Valley II
asks whether courts can enhance fee awards to reflect risk of non-payment in any
kind of class action suit).
'G See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
4' See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUMI. L. REV. 669, 703 (1986) (finding that under the
lodestar approach, defendants can manipulate litigation since they know that
plaintiffs attorneys become more vulnerable to settling for less as time passes);
Christopher P. Lu, Procedural Solutions to the Attorney's Fee Problem in Complex
Litigation, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 41 (1992) (attempting to resolve the abuses of the
system as evidenced by outrageous legal fees); Bennet A. McConaughy, Back to the
Future: Use of Percentage Fee Arrangements in Common Fund Litigation, 12 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 43, 44 (1992) (noting general dissatisfaction with methods
that measure hours expended); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHm. L. REV. 1, 51 (1991) (noting
that time sheets can be prepared imaginatively after the fact); Moore, supra, note
6, at 27 (noting that attorneys can pad time sheets and engage in "wasteful projects to inflate" their fee award); Report of the Third Circuit Task Force: Court
Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 247-48 (1985) (finding that lodestar method encourages lawyers to work unnecessarily, to overstate their rates and to inflate their hours in anticipation of the court awarding less than the requested fee).
Even when a court is cognizant of this problem, it is ill-prepared to question
the accuracy of time sheets and the necessity of certain tasks. Macey & Miller,
supra, at 50-51. Thus, it is impossible ever to come to a fair assessment of the
reasonable value of the reasonable hours spent in litigating a particular case. Even
when counsel supplies the court with documentation supporting its requested fee
in comparison, for example, to practicing attorneys in counsel's locale, the court is
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It is for this reason, among others, that many courts, including
the Ninth Circuit, turned to the percentage method of computing fees under the common fund doctrine.
D. Benchmark PercentageApproach in the Ninth Circuit
Courts have attempted to circumvent the lodestar problem
by awarding fees to the class that are a percentage of its total
recovery, similar to a personal injury case taken on a contingency fee basis. Recent cases have championed a "benchmark"
percentage (where the "bench" sets the rate) in the wake of two
major statements from the judiciary.4 8 One, a report by a task
force created by the Third Circuit, explored the problems of
lodestar4 9 and concluded with a forceful recommendation that
a percentage approach was preferable to lodestar and that
courts should set the fee as early in the suit as possible. In
addition, the report preferred the use of a sliding scale with a
bonus if early settlement is achieved." The second was a
seemingly minor comment by the Supreme Court in Blum v.
Stenson."1 In a footnote, the Court distinguished the method
unable to determine whether this particular attorney merits similar fees. See id.
at 52. This problem is highlighted by the fact that only the court monitors the
attorneys. Defendants, once their liability is determined, justifiably are not concerned with what percentage of the total award money is allocated to the class
rather than to the lawyers. Similarly, plaintiffs in a class action suit are not in
any position to step forward to fight the fee petition since they commonly are far
removed from the entire litigation process. Cf id. at 46-47 ("[S]ettlement hearings
are typically pep rallies jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs' counsel and defense counsel.").
"sThese recent cases include: Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers,
904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that "a reasonable fee under the common fund doctrine is calculated as a percentage of the recovery" and citing footnote 16 of the Blum decision as support for this assertion); Paul, Johnson, Alston
& Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989) (while leaving the calculation of the fee to the lower court, taking note of both the Third Circuit Task
Force's recommendation of a percentage approach and the Blum Court's approval
of a percentage approach as reasonable); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp.
1373 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (noting that the Supreme Court in Blum approved a percentage approach and the Third Circuit's recommendation of the same).
"' The Third Circuit appointed the task force to investigate and report on the
problems surrounding compensation of attorneys in common fund litigation. Courts
in the Third Circuit had been using the lodestar approach as the Third Circuit
prescribed in Lindy. See generally Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, supra
note 47.
'0 Id. at 255-56.
rl 465 U.S. 886 (1984). For a discussion of the Blum decision regarding to the
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of awarding attorneys' fees in statutory fee-shifting cases,
which use a lodestar analysis, from the "calculation of
attorneys' fees under the 'common fund doctrine,' where a
reasonable fee is based on a percentage of the fund bestowed on
the class."5 2
The Ninth Circuit noted both the task force report and the
53
Blum footnote in Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty
That case involved attorneys who, while representing a trustee
of an estate in bankruptcy with whom they had a thirty percent contingency fee agreement, had also served to settle
claims that affected a class of investors in the bankrupt estate.
The attorneys petitioned for and received from the district
court a similar contingency fee out of the personal claims. 4
The court found that a percentage approach, especially an
adjustable, twenty-five-percent benchmark percentage, was
preferable to a lodestar approach because it would be impossible to distinguish the number of hours the firm had spent in
regard to the benefit accrued to the class as opposed to the
other claims." Although the court declined to hold that the
percentage approach was inherently better than the lodestar
method, it found that the circumstances of this particular case
favored a percentage methodology.
Indeed, the practice of awarding a benchmark percentage
has been attacked for the same reasons that it has been embraced. Early settlements, many claim, are also "cheap settlements," dispensing only a small award to the class while simultaneously providing a windfall for the attorneys who have
not had to demonstrate hard work to obtain their fee. This

use of multipliers in lodestar calculations, see supra text accompanying note 42.
" Blum, 465 U.S. at 901. (emphasis added); see Brown v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 838 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1988) (using the Blum footnote as rationale for holding that a percentage fee is a reasonable fee); In Re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F.
Supp. 1373, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that absent extraordinary circumstances, court will employ 30% benchmark). But cf. In re Wicat Sec., 671 F. Supp.
726, 731 (D. Utah 1987) (noting that some courts view Blum as endorsing a percentage method, while other courts believe the Court was merely noting that the
method serves as a 'useful gauge"); Rothfarb v. Hambrecht, 649 F. Supp. 843, 185,
n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (noting that footnote 16 of Blum seems to indicate only that
a percentage of recovery is permissible, not required).
63 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 270.
Id. at 272.
Moore, supra note 6, at 27; see also Macey & Miller, supra note 47, at 59-61
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very criticism was, in fact, the motivation for the development
of lodestar.57
In the Ninth Circuit, then, the decision to use a lodestar or
percentage computation was a matter of judicial discretion at
the time of the Oracle decisions. In Six Mexican Workers v.
Arizona Citrus Growers," for example, decided one month
after Oracle I, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
award of twenty-five percent of recovery, noting that the
benchmark could be modified if "special circumstances" demonstrated that the award was too small or large based on the
hours expended." One year later, another jurist in the Northern District of California noted that "either the lodestar or the
percentage-of-the-fund approach may... have its place in
determining what would be reasonable compensation for creating a common fund" in a securities-related class action suit."
Given such flexibility, no one could have expected that the
Oracle litigation would result in an entirely new method of
compensating common fund attorneys.

(noting that, despite promise of ease in calculating fees and fairness of a brightline rule, the percentage approach nonetheless results in surplus profits to
plaintiffs' attorneys since they will be forced to litigate cases only when, at a
minimum, they will be assured of recouping their costs).
" See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977)
("For the sake of their own integrity, the integrity of the legal profession and the
integrity of Rule 23, it is important that the courts should avoid awarding 'Windfall fees") (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d. 448, 469 (2d Cir.
1974)). See also supra note 47.
58 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).
5 Id. at 1311. Six Mexican Workers did not involve a securities violation, but
rather violations of the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, which regulates
agricultural employment and bookkeeping methods. As with securities laws, the
Act does not provide for fee-shifting; the attorneys in this case applied for fees
under the common fund doctrine. Id. at 1310-11.
" In re Businessland Sec. Litig., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)
96,059 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1991); see also In re Public Service Co. of
New Mexico, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) % 96,988 (S.D. Cal.
July 28, 1992) (using both lodestar and percentage approach to insure reasonable
fee); In re Washington Public Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 779 F. Supp. 1056,
1059 (D. Ariz. 1991) (noting that Ninth Circuit recognizes both procedures);
Antonopulos v. North Am. Thoroughbreds, Inc., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH)
96,058 (S.D. Cal. June 24, 1991) (granting fees equivalent to 30% of
recovery or lodestar plus 1.11 multiplier); cf. Morganstein v. Esber, 768 F. Supp.
725, 726 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (citing Paul, Johnson and Alston & Hunt for the assertion that the Ninth Circuit adopted a benchmark percentage approach).
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II. IN RE ORACLE SECURITIES LITIGATION
The litigation brought by the shareholders of Oracle Software Systems has not yet come to a close. 6 Nonetheless, a

district court in the Northern District of California has issued
four written opinions."

This Comment discusses the first

three opinions, in which the court addressed the issues of attorney compensation and choice of lead counsel. The last opinion was written in response to a settlement proposal.6 3
A. Oracle I: The Orderfor Competitive Bids'
Within two weeks of March 27, 1990, report of unsatisfactory earnings by the Oracle Systems Corporation ("Oracle"), a
Silicon Valley software manufacturer, and a subsequent drop
in the price of Oracle stock, nineteen separate class action
complaints by Oracle's shareholders and several derivative
actions on behalf of the corporation had been filed in the
Northern District of California.6 5 The court received motions
"l The parties brought a settlement agreement to the court on April 22, 1993.
Oracle IV, 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
62 In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (Oracle 1); 132
F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (Oracle I/); 136 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (Oracle
II1); 829 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (Oracle IV).
c' This Comment will not analyze this last opinion in which Judge Walker
discussed at length the substantive inadequacies of the suits (class action and
derivative) and the substantial recovery to the class ($23.25 million from Oracle
and $1.75 million from Arthur Andersen & Co.), which the settlement agreement
had proposed. The court nonetheless rejected the agreement because it was contingent upon a dismissal of the derivative suit without any benefits paid to the derivative class, save payment of up to $250,000 from Oracle to derivative counsel
for costs and fees. Oracle IV, 829 F. Supp. at 1178, 1190.
', Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 690.
C The plaintiffs alleged that Oracle Systems undertook to deceive investors by
making false reports concerning the corporation's financial status and business
prospects. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that certain officers:
(1) ke[pt] the software company's books and records open for additional
business days after the close of the last day of the quarter; (2) backdated] licensing and other agreements; (3) "fill[ed] the pipeline" by postponing recognition of revenues and net income from one quarter to another; (4) recogniz[ed] revenue upon execution of sales contracts when the
product was not in production or was unavailable; and (5) improperly
recogni[zed] the entire amount of potential income called for in an agreement immediately upon the signing of the contract.
John C. Yates, COMPUTER LAw., Jan. 1992, at 12 n.6. The intentionally misleading
accounting procedures, the plaintiffs claimed, caused the inflation of Oracle stocks

1684

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59: 1667

to certify the class and to appoint lead counsel.66
Before the court had ruled on the issue of lead counsel,
however, two plaintiff firms-Berger & Montague and Milberg,
Weiss, Bershad, Specthrie & Lerach-jointly decided to hold a
meeting on April 12, 1990, and invited all firms representing
the shareholders to attend. The purpose of the meeting was to
discuss and vote on the appointment of lead counsel. 67 A few
firms refused to attend." The meeting resulted in the nomination of the Berger and Milberg firms to serve as co-lead
counsel. On May 4, 1990, these firms sought the court's confirmation of their nomination.
Two plaintiff firms that had not attended the meeting-David B. Gold and Kaufman, Malchman, Kaufman &
Kirby-opposed the motion, seeking the same appointment for
themselves. The two camps of attorneys "squared off, sending
volleys of disparagement at one another."69 This "contest" was
to artificial levels and deceived the shareholders in violation of §§ 10(b), 20 and
29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 691; Oracle
Systems Corp., 10-Q Filing, at 14 (SEC Online, Jan. 8, 1993) [hereinafter "10-Q
Filing"]. The plaintiffs sought compensatory damages, as well as a return of profits
and a new election of directors under the derivative suit claim of insider trading.
10-Q Filing, supra, at 14.
6 Oracle 1, 131 F.R.D. at 690. The class was certified by three orders entered
on February 18, 1991, November 26, 1991 and February 12, 1992. The class consists of purchasers of Oracle common stock and purchasers of call options for common stock from July 11, 1989, through September 26, 1990. 10-Q Filing, supra
note 65, at 14.
, Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 690. Their method of meeting to plan and choose
lead counsel was not unusual. In In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562
(3d Cir. 1984), the law firms that had filed the initial complaints similarly met to
plan a common strategy at which point they elected an executive committee and a
co-lead counsel team to steer and litigate the action. The court approved the selections. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
68 Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 690. Only fifteen of the twenty-nine firms representing shareholders who had filed class action complaints attended this meeting. The
court suggested that the others, especially those of the David B. Gold and
Kaufnan, Malchman, Kaufman & Kirby firms, had not attended because they
"sens[ed] that they would have been outvoted on any decisions." Id. Similarly, in
In re Dunkin Donuts Litig., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [
95,725 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1990), counsel for class plaintiffs met and selected lead
counsel. Certain law firms were dissatisfied with the selection and proceeded to
work on their own. They were penalized for this dissidence when, at the close of
litigation, the court disallowed reimbursement for the work they had done that appeared to duplicate the work completed by the court-appointed groups.
69 Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 690. The Berger-Milberg firms described David B.
Gold as a "chronic dissident" and "obnoxiously old fashioned." He responded by
accusing the Berger-Milberg partnership of conducting "Mayor Daley electoral pro-
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put to an end by the court, which ruled that it would choose
lead counsel on the basis of budgets to be submitted to it by
the interested firms.7" When the deadline for budget submission arrived, the court was presented with only one budget,
submitted by the newly formed association of the Berger and
Gold firms.71 Disgruntled by the reluctance of the attorneys to
compete for the position, the court rejected the proposal outright.

72

Instead, Judge Walker began his opinion in Oracle I by
quoting Judge Patel, a colleague in the Northern District of
California, in her lamentation of the "all too familiar path of
large [class action] securities cases," 7 "[alt the end of [which]
are plaintiffs' applications for attorneys fees."74 Characterizing
Judge Patel's opinion as "a call for future courts to rely on new

cesses." Id.

70 Id. at 690.
71 The court conjectured that

"[tihe prospect of competition . . . had whistled
an end to the shouting match." Id. at 691. The Berger and Gold proposal called
for the award of a benchmark percentage fee of 30%, as in In re Activision Sec.
Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1989). Additionally, the proposal projected
costs at $400,000 to $780,000 if the case settled before trial, and an additional
$400,000 to $600,000 in the event of trial. Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 691.
72 The usual procedure for determining lead counsel is a vote by the attorneys
themselves, as was attempted in the Oracle litigation. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. As far as can be determined, never before has a court objected
to this procedure with a written order. Judge Walker, however, innovatively combined both the method of payment, with which he was dissatisfied, and the method of choosing class counsel. Even though the Berger-Gold team responded to the
court's request for budgets by proposing to receive a percentage fee of 30%, the
court, annoyed with counsel, took the opportunity to criticize the lodestar approach
and, thus, to justify a new bidding process.
"' Activision, 723 F. Supp. at 1374. Judge Patel, distressed over the theatrics
of large securities cases, accepted the decision of a special master to grant fees on
the basis of a lodestar determination, but promised in the future to grant fees
only on the basis of a benchmark percentage. Id. at 1378-79. Judge Patel found
that, by and large, the lodestar figure typically amounts to approximately 30% of
the fund, rendering unproductive the complicated analysis that lodestar requires.
Id. at 1375. A "benchmark" percentage, on the other hand, "providefs] predictability for attorneys and class members and reduce[s] the time consumed by counsel
and court in dealing with voluminous fee petitions." Id. at 1378-79. The court
pointed to Blum v. Stenson, the Report of the Third Circuit Task Force and Paul,
Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty (which had been decided one week earlier) to
justify its decision. Id. at 1375-77. See supra notes 18 & 48-60 and accompanying
text.
14 Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 689. Both Judge Walker's and Judge Patel's disgust
seems to be endemic to the Ninth Circuit. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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methods," Judge Walker plunged into a scathing review of the
lodestar approach.75
As the court noted, although the plaintiffs' causes of action
were based on sections 10(b), 20, and 29(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and, as such, did not give rise to an
award of attorney fees, such claims can lead to the creation of
a common fund through which counsel may be reimbursed.7"
Typically, at the resolution of litigation, plaintiffs' attorneys
apply to the court to award their fe6 out of this fund through
either the lodestar method or as a percentage of the award.
Post-litigation applications, according to Judge Walker,
thwart the adversarial process." In particular, lodestar has
been "discredited by experience" and is "unworkable because.., it abandons the adversar[ial] process upon which our
judicial system is based."78 By requiring the court to review
the performance of counsel once the litigation has terminated,
the court forgoes its position as a neutral adjudicator and is
forced to act as a fiduciary to the class by challenging the fee
petition sua sponte"
Judge Walker additionally claimed that awarding fees
with hindsight is problematic in itself. For example, even with
a large settlement, a judge may be tempted to give a smaller
fee to counsel who conducted less discovery than to one who
had conducted more discovery in a case where the award was
substantially less. Moreover, since early resolution of a case

"' Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 689. Judge Walker was not obliged to explain his
refusal to use lodestar calculations since the Ninth Circuit permits its courts to
use either lodestar or percentage approaches. See Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona
Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990); see supra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text.
" Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 691; see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375
(1970) ("The absence of express statutory authority does not preclude an award of
attorney's fees in suits of this type."); see supra notes 24-34 and accompanying
text.
"7 Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 689. When a statute provides for the award of fees,
noted the court, the fee claim may be contested in an adversary proceeding. Id. at
691. With the exception of one case, In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d
562, 568 (3d Cir. 1984), plaintiffs are rarely involved in this application process.

Id.

78 Id. Both the lodestar and percentage approaches have been severely criticized as "anti-plaintiff' methods of compensation, since there is no adversarial
contest over the fee. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
" See In re Capital Underwriters, Inc. Sec. Litig., 519 F. Supp. 92, 97-98 (N.D.
Cal. 1981).
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would lead to a smaller fee, attorneys have an incentive to
prolong
the litigation; the system thereby rewards "litigious80
ness."
Competitive bidding, Judge Walker held, was a natural
resolution of this problem. Since experienced counsel should be
able to assess the risks and, therefore, the costs of litigation, it
could propose low fees without bidding below its actual cost
and causing injury to itself in an effort to win the competition."1 Furthermore, bidding compensates for the loss of competition inherent in the other two methods of compensation by
ensuring the court's impartiality and simulating the manner in
which a class member herself would choose counsel-finding
the best attorney for the best price." Since Rule 23(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the court to take
steps to insure the "protection of the members of the class" and
provides for notification of the class to determine "whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate," Judge
Walker surmised that it was the "class members' standard of
fairness and adequacy, not that of the court, which should
govern the court's protection of the interests of the class.""
Thus, the court should approximate the manner in which the
class members would choose counsel if they could.
The court then examined the ways in which lawyers are
typically compensated: either by the hourly fee, the fixed fee or
the contingent fee.' Judge Walker found the contingent fee
most suitable for the common fund, class action suit because
members of the class typically will not monitor their attorney's
hourly claims and because a pre-determined fixed fee creates a
disincentive for hard work. 5 The contingent fee, paying an

"

Oracle 1, 131 F.R.D. at 692.

81

Id.

at 693. Judge Walker deduced the capability to assess the risk from the

"Law of Large Numbers," which states that the greater the number of variables
involved, the greater the ability to predict an outcome. Id. at 693, n.11.
82 Id. at 690-92. For a different approach by which this goal is actually accomplished, see infra notes 152-157 and accompanying text.
' Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 691-92 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 23(d)).
84 Id. at 694. Fixed fees, according to the court, are appropriate only when the
tasks of the attorney are clear and the client can readily monitor counsel's work.
Payment by hourly fees generally occurs with "sophisticated clients," like large
corporations. This class of clientele has the 'means and ability to monitor the attorney, and the "stakes are [generally] high." Id.
85 Id. at 694.
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attorney out of the plaintiffs award, permits the realization of
cases otherwise impracticable for plaintiffs and links the fee to
the success of the case,
thereby providing incentive for lawyers
6
zealously.
litigate
to
Yet, when the court examined the manner in which other
courts had settled on the percentage of the contingent fee,
Judge Walker found that no matter what a court arrived at, it
was only an expression of one single judge's belief of what
constituted "fair and reasonable" compensation.8 7 Judge Walker pointed out that the Ninth Circuit had resolved this problem
by approving a permanent contingency percentage of twentyfive percent-the "benchmark" percentage-which could be
adjusted upwards or downwards to reflect the unique characteristics of a given case. 8 This method, claimed Judge Walker, is little better than lodestar because it, too, leaves the
amount of the fee uncertain until after the litigation comes to
a close. 9 Moreover, since the bench may not be in a position
to assess what may be a reasonable fee, a bidding process
would naturally create a reasonable fee by emulating market
forces."0
Additionally, Judge Walker discussed three other possible
results that could occur from using predetermined benchmark
percentages. First, the fixed percentage places a rigid value on
time. Since the fee remains constant and necessarily increases
with the award, delays in litigation could go unpunished under
such a system, while other cases may never be initiated if the

" The Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides

that "[a]

lawyer

should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981). Similarly, the Model Rules mandate
that "a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1992).
, Oracle 1, 131 F.R.D. at 695.
Id. (citing Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th
Cir. 1989)); see supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
8- Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 695.
" Judge Walker noted that few judges ever have first-hand knowledge of the
rates charged by counsel appearing before them. Many judges come to the bench
having never been in private practice, or not having been in practice for a long
time. Id. Those who believe that they have such expertise, claims Judge Walker,
are probably only "fooling themselves." Id. at 696. Judge Walker himself, however,
presumably had that expertise, having been a securities litigator before his appointment to the bench. Anne M. Rossheim, Fee Bidding in Common Fund Cases:
New Approach Sparks Controversy, OF COUNSEL, Jan. 21, 1991, at 10.
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percentage rate is improperly low. Second, when cases could
be, but are not, brought for less than the twenty-five percentage, the use of a benchmark percentage constitutes a disservice
to the class, thereby undermining the court's fiduciary duty in
a class action. Third, using a predetermined percentage eliminates the competitive price factor that the bidding process
necessarily engenders, leaving the court to choose counsel
based upon counsel's own "self-serving descriptions." 91
Thus, Judge Walker rejected the use of a benchmark percentage. Instead, he decided to choose lead counsel and assess
its compensation through the process of competitive bidding.
This process, Judge Walker claimed, would be based on the
benefits to the class (not self-serving descriptions) and would
result in lower bids than that of a benchmark percentage approach.9 2 Oracle I ended with a call for in camera bids specifying qualifications and percentage of recovery that the firm
would seek.
B. Oracle II: The OrderAppointing Class Counsel9 3
Only four out of twenty-nine possible firms responded to
Judge Walker's call for competitive bids. 94 In this order, after
describing each of the four bids at length, Judge Walker settled on the bid by Lowey, Dannenberg, Bemporad, Brachtl &
Selinger, P.C. to serve as lead counsel.9 5 In doing so, he focused primarily upon the structure of the bids, rather than the
qualifications of counsel.
Judge Walker first discussed the bid of Abbey & Ellis,
noting its location (New York), size (ten lawyers) and experi-

Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 696. Judge Walker asserted that this self-adulation
led to "rhetorical sparring match[es]." However, such sparring matches are not
surprising in light of the fact that lead counsel commands a higher award than
other counsel. NEWBURG, supra note 21, § 9.35.
92 Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 697. Ironically, the process resulted in bids that
Judge Walker later pronounced as remarkably similar to those that would have
been awarded under a lodestar regime. Oracle III, 136 F.R.D. 639, 650 (N.D. Cal.
1991).
13 132 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
" The four firms were: Abbey & Ellis; Berger & Montague, P.C.; David B.
Gold, PLC; and Lowey, Dannenberg, Bemporad, Brachtl & Selinger, P.C. Id. at
539.
91

" Id. at 548.
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ence in similar matters. The firm bid a straight contingency
fee, twenty-two and one-half percent (after a request by the
court for modification of its original twenty-four-percent bid to
cover both fees and expenses).
Next, Judge Walker examined the bid submitted by Berger
& Montague, P.C., a Philadelphia firm of forty-two lawyers,
apparently experienced in securities litigation.9 6 The bid
ranged from twenty-five percent for early settlement to a thirty-seven percent fee if the case was appealed. Within this
range of contingency, their fee would fluctuate further depending on the amount of recovery to the class.97
The David B. Gold firm, next addressed by Judge Walker,
was located in San Francisco, consisted of twelve attorneys and
was quite experienced in complex class litigation, especially in
technology-related areas.9" The firm even had extensive experience in litigating against defense counsel in this case. Its bid
proposed a range of fees from ten percent to thirty percent, but
rather than increasing with the award as did the Berger bid,
fees for counsel under this structure would decrease as the
award to the class increased and would also decrease with
time.99

"6The court noted that Berger & Montague had a relationship with a San
Jose, California firm which warranted a mention on its stationary. Its proposal,
however, neglected to mention how this would effect the firm in litigation in the
Northern District of California. Id. at 540.
9 The court provided a chart of the Berger & Montague bid:
Early
Document
Deposition
Trial
Appeal
Settlement
Stage
Stage
Recovery
Up to $10M 27%
26%
27%
32%
37%
$10M-$20M 25%
24%
25%
30%
35%
$20M-$50M 25%
24%
24%
30%
32%
$50M plus
25%
24%
24%
29%
30%
Id. at 540.
'8

Id. at 541.

9' The court believed the Gold bid thus could be viewed in the following manner:
Time for Resolution (months)
Recovery
0-12
13-18
19-24
25-30
30
Up to $30M
30%
29%
28%
26%
25%
$30M-$60M
27%
26%
25%
23%
22%
$60M-$100M
25%
24%
23%
21%
20%
$100M-$130M
22%
21%
20%
18%
17%
$130M-$160M
19%
18%
17%
15%
14%
$160M-$200M
17%
16%
15%
13%
12%
$200M or more
15%
14%
13%
11%
10%

IN RE ORACLE SECURITIES LITIGATION

19941

Lowey, Dannenberg, Bemporad, Brachtl & Selinger submitted the fourth bid. Judge Walker noted that this New York
firm had a staff of eleven attorneys and specialized in securities litigation."' The Lowey bid was simpler than the Berger
and Gold bids, ranging from a twelve or fifteen percent fee
award if the settlement to the class exceeded fifteen million
dollars to twenty-four or thirty percent if the settlement was
one million dollars or less; the lower percentage figure in each
instance would be awarded if the litigation were resolved within one year. The bid also included an expense cap of
$325,000.101
Judge Walker then discussed the portion of the bids
wherein the bidders discussed their qualifications. Finding
them to be unhelpful "celebrity endorsements," Judge Walker
dismissed these "judicial bouquets" as "subjective and contextual ... puffer[y]" which is "immaterial in selecting class counsel" in this type of litigation where an attorney has little or no
client contact. 11 2 "None of the bidders," observed Judge Walker, "demonstrated qualitative distinctions sufficient to outweigh price considerations."'0 3 The only distinctive difference
in quality, asserted the Judge, was that the Gold and Lowey
bids suggested control over litigation costs. In the case of the
Gold firm, it was its proximity to the area that would keep
costs down. The Lowey bid, as mentioned above, contained an
expense cap.
Turning to fees, Judge Walker then praised the competitive bidding system for saving money for the class through a
declining percentage recovery.' 4 The attorneys, according to

Id. at 541.
"'

Id.

Id. The Lowey bid, as constructed by the court, was presented as follows:
Time for resolution (months)
13 or more
0-12
Recovery
30%
24%
Up to $1M
25%
20%
$1M-$5M
20%
16%
$5M-$15M
15%
12%
$15M or more
..
2 Id. at 542 & n.9. In Oracle III, Judge Walker noted that the Lowey firm
was "adequately qualified to represent a class of Oracle shareholders." 136 F.R.D.
639, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1991). However, the court based this judgment on observing
the Lowey firm at work after it had been awarded the position as lead counsel.
1
Oracle II, 132 F.R.D. at 542 n.10.
104 The court also noted a suggestion by derivative counsel that the percentage
"o
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Judge Walker, recognized that a higher award to the class is
not necessarily attributable to harder work."' Judge Walker
then embarked on a detailed comparison of the savings to the
class within the varying structures of the four bids. He rejected
the Gold bid, which included a decrease with the passage of
time, as it would heighten the possibility of a "sell-out settle0 6
ment.""
The Abbey bid, although similar in average fee level
to the Lowey bid, failed to provide contingencies for early settlement and "runaway litigation expenses," thus exposing it to
the possibility of an "attorney windfall."0 7 Only the Berger
and Lowey bids, noted Judge Walker, corresponded to the
competitive market by providing for an increase in the award
with time, although the Lowey fee would decrease if settled in
under one year.0 8 In the level of fees, then, "Lowey
10 9
trump [ed] Berger."
Judge Walker thus settled on the Lowey bid. He found
that since Lowey was a "repeat player," it would not be tempted to "sell-out" and injure its professional reputation."' Additionally, Judge Walker maintained that the bid was in keeping
with Judge Patel's suggestion in the Activision opinion that
thirty percent was an appropriate benchmark figure."'

should not decrease, but should increase because of the incentive of "percentage
contingency lawyers . .. 'to settle prematurely and cheaply.'" Id. at 543. However,
Judge Walker described such a system as substituting "amount of recovery" for
"amount of effort." Id. at 544.
10" Id. at 543. Judge Walker noted that this economizing does not occur when a
benchmark percentage system of payment is employed. Id. at 542.
'06 Id. at 546.

'07Id. The Abbey bid used a straight percentage approach.
108 In this way, the bids compensate for the absence of monitoring by a "sophisticated" client. Id. at 547 (quoting Coffee, supra note 47, at 697).
"08Oracle II, 132 F.R.D. at 547. The main distinguishing feature of the Lowey
bid is that it set an expense cap. The attractiveness of this feature is addressed
in Oracle III.
no Id.
. Id. Judge Walker's comparison of the bid to a typical benchmark figure may
lead one to question why the court bothered to seek competitive bids, inasmuch as
it acknowledged that the outcome of bidding is similar to an outcome under both
the percentage and lodestar approaches. Judge Walker most likely made this assertion to dispel those critics who would assail deviating from those systems.
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2
C. Oracle III: The OrderDenying Motion for Rehearing".

The Gold firm motioned the court to set aside its ruling,
alleging that the competitive bid selection process was illegal
and the Lowey bid itself was unethical. Gold argued first that
given the low expense cap with which Lowey had constrained
itself, a conflict of interest was bound to occur when the firm
was faced with rising litigation costs. At such a point, argued
the Gold firm, Lowey would be forced to cut corners. According
to Gold, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct section
1.7(b), which mirrored the California Rules of Professional
Conduct,"' prohibits a lawyer from representing a client "if
the representation... may be materially limited by... the
lawyer's own interests.""' Second, the Gold firm claimed that
public disclosure of the bids prejudiced the class by revealing
5
plaintiffs' evaluation of the suit to the defendants." In the
Oracle III opinion, Judge Walker refused to reconsider the
ruling. He believed that the process was successful; bids were
submitted to the court within three weeks, and he felt that
once the process came to be used with more frequency, the
type of reargument that the court now had before it would "fall
away." 6
The court also rejected the conflict of interest argument.
Judge Walker claimed that the firm would harm itself if, at
some point, it ceased to make outlays for necessary expenditures (such as expert witnesses). On the other hand, when
such expenditures strengthen a case, they necessarily increase
the amount of the firm's fee award." 7 Similarly, Judge Walk-

112

136 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Cal. 1991).

113

Id. at 642 n.6.

at 642. Under Rule 1.8(j), an attorney is not permitted to have a "proprietary interest in the litigation." CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1.8(j) (1993).
...Oracle III, 136 F.R.D. at 644-45. In Oracle I the court had requested in
camera bids and did not advise counsel that the results would appear in a published opinion. Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
116 Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 641 n.4. In fact, Judge Walker's assumption is naive.
Since attorneys vie for the position of lead counsel to secure more money for their
firms, there is no reason to believe that they would stop litigating such types of
rulings at any point. See NEWBURG, supra note 21, § 9.35.
..
7 Oracle III, 136 F.R.D. at 642-44. Judge Walker also claimed that full reimbursement of expenses would lead to extravagant use of "non-attorney litigation
input," encouraging dependency on computer use and non-legal staff. Full reim114

Id.
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er found no merit to Gold's interpretation of the ABA Model
Rules. According to Gold, Lowey's expense cap violated these
rules by "giving the Lowey firm an 'interest in the
litigation'... by requiring an 'investment' which will not be
paid back.""' Judge Walker found that the ABA Model Rules
do not suggest that a lawyer must be repaid fully. 9 Further,
Judge Walker noted that repayment of litigation expenses by
the class in a class action suit is impractical and unrealis120

tic.

Finally, Judge Walker dismissed the disclosure argument
under which Gold had asserted that the defense now had important information from Lowey's valuation of the case. This
information, according to Gold, would permit the defendants to
"squeeze" the plaintiffs by prolonging litigation until the firm's
expense cap had been depleted. Judge Walker, however, found
no legal grounds for this argument. He noted that attorneys'
fees are, as a matter of law, not privileged information. 12
Moreover, according to Judge Walker, unlike the use of lodestar and benchmark percentage approaches, this method of
submitting competitive bids to the court provides a surrogate
for the absent plaintiff class that is unable to monitor its attorbursement, he felt, also "encourages a form of cheating." Id. at 644.
118 Id. at 642. Attorneys are not permitted to buy interests in litigation even
though some commentators have suggested that this archaic rule against champerty be abolished. See, e.g., Dawn S. Garrett, Lending a Helping Hand: Professional
Responsibility and Attorney-Client Financing Prohibitions, 16 DAYTON L. REV. 221
(1990) (arguing that attorneys should be permitted to advance subsistence loans to
clients); Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
997, 1028 (1989). Champerty is defined as a "bargain between a stranger and a
party to a lawsuit by which the stranger pursues the party's claim in consideration of receiving any part of the judgment proceeds." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

231 (6th ed. 1990). It is a form of maintenance, "supporting, or promoting the
litigation of another." Id. In cases taken on a contingency basis, law firms are, in
essence, forwarding money to their clients in the form of services. See Lester
Brickman, Contingency Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 31-39 (1989).
119 In fact, under ABA MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.8(e)(1), "a
lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which
may be contingent on the outcome of the matter."
120 Oracle III, 136 F.R.D. at 643. While repayment by the class is impracticable,
in a lodestar regime a court typically reviews expense data and arranges for reimbursement. See, e.g., In re Wicat Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 726, 742 (D. Utah 1987)
(allowing for expenses but deducting expenses already included in hourly rate).
121 Oracle III, 136 F.R.D. at 645 (citing Tornay v. United
States, 840 F.2d 1424
(9th Cir. 1988) and In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1975)).
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neys.
The Oracle III order ended with yet another call for bids,
this time to select counsel to litigate against an added defendant (the Arthur Anderson accounting firm), which the Lowey
22
firm had refused to include under the former arrangement.'
The order makes clear, however, that it was not designating
lead counsel, but rather the only counsel to proceed against
this defendant."

III. ANALYSIS OF THE ORACLE TRILOGY
A. The Opinions
Judge Walker's decision to employ a competitive bidding
system is commendable for several reasons. First, the court
acted in a way hoped for by most scholars, but rarely ever
seen, by affirmatively responding to distress in the legal com24
munity over a serious and complex problem.' Second, the
court intelligently identified and attempted to address the
inherent problems of lodestar and an award system that expects its participants to evaluate themselves retroactively and
neutrally. The court, however, failed to recognize that many of
the problems remain or are simply substituted by others in its
alternative approach. Therefore, the Oracle system fails to go
far enough in fashioning a new method of computing fees in
common fund securities litigation.
In Oracle I, Judge Walker expressed his desire to emulate
the free-market system by soliciting bids. Specifically, the
court requested that any law firm interested in obtaining the

Oracle III, 136 F.R.D. at 651.
Id. Although this Comment does not address any issues concerning this last
call for bids, it is questionable whether the court's demand that only one attorney
litigate against this defendant is in violation of any retainer contracts between
shareholders and counsel that already may have given certain attorneys the right
to litigate this claim for the contracting shareholders.
12 As noted, Judge Walker claimed to be responding specifically to Judge
Patel's call for change in the compensation system for attorneys in class action
suits. Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 689. Notwithstanding Judge Patel's clear dissatisfaction with lodestar, it is clear that in Activision, the court was not calling for solutions. On the contrary, the court had found it-Judge Patel firmly advocated the
use of an adjustable benchmark percentage. In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F.
Supp. 1373, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
122
12
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appointment as lead counsel should deliver to the court an
application setting forth the firm's qualifications as well as
fees to be charged (in the event of recovery).'25 Once the bids
were in, however, the court chose not to address the qualifications of the firms, finding it "impossible to distinguish among
the[m] in terms of their background, experience and legal abilities." 26 The court did find some distinctions, noting that the
Gold firm could minimize litigation expenses due to its California location and that the Lowey firm had proposed an expense
cap. "27
' In this respect, the court was merely making another
cost-saving decision and not addressing the quality of the firms
at all. Similarly, Judge Walker noted that the Gold firm had
often litigated against defense counsel. This point was not
discussed at any length, leaving the reader unaware of whether Gold had been successful or unsuccessful in litigating those
claims.
A process that seeks to emulate the "free market" would
have to consider quality as well as cost: no consumer wants "a
thing built by the lowest bidder."'28 Likewise, even the most
savvy client with great monitoring capability will not choose an
attorney on the basis of cost alone. Indeed, attorneys are commonly chosen only because of their reputation and recommendations. Even the Supreme Court has recognized that experience and skill may lead to higher rates for counsel.'29 As one
commentator noted, an attorney "may have such a low opportunity cost because of a correspondingly low ability." 3 ° One
would suspect that an attorney working for low fees is probably just "starting out" and a complex class action is hardly the
place for a new attorney to start. Yet, when confronted with
materials submitted in response to the request for the bid pro-

15 Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. at 697.
126 Oracle II, 132 F.R.D. at 542.
"
128

Id. at 542.
Wilford, supra note 1, at 25.

" Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898 (1984) ("[Tihe special skill and experience of counsel should be reflected in the . . . rate[l.").
...John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the PrivateAttorney General: Why the Model of
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 288 n.142
(1983). But cf John E. Morris, Federal Judge Orders Counsel to Bid for Case,
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 20, 1990, at 10 (law school professor approvingly notes that
Oracle bidding system substitutes market forces for retroactive assessment of fair

fee).
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posals to describe the firm's qualifications, Judge Walker surprisingly dismissed the matter as "flattering remarks of judges
before whom the bidders have litigated... subjective, contextual, basically pufferies" which were worthless to the court.'
Judge Walker's solution also does not escape some of the
substantive problems that the lodestar method faces. By setting a fixed cap on expenses for the litigation, competitive
bidding creates the real possibility to induce the winning bid132
der to settle early when costs begin to mount. Judge Walker dismissed this problem vis-A-vis the Lowey firm by claiming
that, as a repeat player, Lowey would not succumb to such a
temptation. But most firms that litigate securities class action
suits presumably are repeat players in the complex securities
arena. Thus, Judge Walker's distinction is puzzling in this
respect as well. Judge Walker rather blithely ignores Gold's
powerful argument that defense counsel now has an important
piece of information. It is unrealistic to imagine that Lowey
would continue to pursue the action vigorously when it has
quadrupled its expense cap. 33
Another issue that the court failed to address is that many
suits alleging violations of securities laws result in equitable
relief."4 If a case ended with an injunction, but no cash
award, the court would have difficulty doling out a fee based
on a predetermined percentage of the award. Such a result
would confound any incentive for employing a competitive bid,
unless a court could be certain beforehand that such relief
would not be granted or would be willing to place a monetary
value on the relief (and then demand the cash from the defendant).
Additionally, in purporting to rescue courts from the
drawn-out reviews of documentation and contests inherent in
computing a fee under the lodestar formula, Judge Walker's
order propelled the court into a series of time-consuming appearances and orders."' While Judge Walker believed that
...Oracle II, 132 F.R.D. at 542.
Macey & Miller, supra note 47, at 113.
'
13 In fact, in the settlement agreement presented to the court, Judge Walker
rejected a clause that purported to give counsel an additional $200,000. Oracle IV,
829 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
,'3 Cf City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2642 (1992) (noting that
vast proportion of contingency-fee cases seek injunctive relief).
135 One commentator thought a similar approach would dispense with the need

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1667

the rearguments were merely due to the innovation of his
order, one cannot help but wonder if that optimism is wishful
thinking.136 Attorneys have their livelihood at stake when litigating unfavorable fee awards. Unless at some point in the
future courts would decline to hear motions for reargument,
the requests for reconsideration would likely continue well into
the litigation.
Finally, Judge Walker's system interferes with the
plaintiffs' choice of counsel. Although there is no constitutional
right to counsel in civil trials such as Oracle, the case law and
complex litigation manuals all strongly presume that the parties-in-interest, through their attorneys, are best suited to
make the decision about who should lead their battle. 13 7
Judge Walker ignored this important policy consideration in
his attempt to fashion a bidding approach, but there is no
reason why this aspect of the bidding system cannot be remedied. The proposed alternative that follows addresses the problem of choice of counsel and the other shortcomings of the
Oracle approach.
B. Alternative Approaches
1. The Suggestions of Other Scholarly Commentators
Judge Walker relied heavily upon the writings of John
Coffee Jr., a professor of law at Columbia University, who has
written extensively on legal representation in securities litigation. In one article, Understandingthe PlaintiffsAttorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of
Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 3 ' Professor Coffee explores alternatives to the lodestar system of compensation. An economic response, according to Professor Coffee,

for judicial review, since "no absent parties . . . could be prejudiced by the litigation." Macey & Miller, supra note 47, at 109. But see Report of the Third Circuit
Task Force, supra note 47, at 258 (cautioning against .the system developing into
an "illusory" solution when it "becomes protracted, hypertechnical, and a battlefield
for the participants").
136 "With greater experience . . . rearguard [sic] maneuvers . . . will fall away."
Oracle III, 136 F.R.D. at 641, n.4.
"s In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
138 Coffee, supra note 47.
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would be to permit counsel to purchase the shareholder's
rights in the litigation through an auction. Even though such a
system would create incentive for a suit to be pursued appropriately it also removes any incentive to detect violations in
the first instance, as one could not be assured of success in
bidding and of recouping the expense of detection and filing.
Giving the right to the first party to file a claim would only
lead to "underresearched, hastily pleaded actions."'39 Professor Coffee notes that the creation of law-firm franchises to
monitor the system for specified violations of law could solve
the problem of his proposed auction system, but at the same
time, it would create other problems: without knowledge of the
violations, appropriate compensation would be impossible to
compute; lower output would stem from the eradication of
competition; and, corruption of the system could be widespread
if defendants themselves began to purchase franchises covertly.
Professor Coffee thus rejects the auction method, turning
to "second best" alternatives.14 One approach would be the
use of multiple damages. If an attorney were receiving compensation as a fraction of the recovery and the recovery was tripled, then the attorney would receive the sum at which a jury
fixed plaintiffs injury. Thus, the attorney would be as inspired
to pursue the claim as the client herself. Other approaches
include increasing the percentage of the award to the attorney
to as much as fifty percent of the recovery. This would have
the effect, asserts Professor Coffee, of inducing attorneys to
seek out violations, thus promoting deterrence. In setting the
benchmark percentage, a court should look to the market and
determine what private parties are willing to pay for the same
services. Professor Coffee acknowledges that some combination
of the second best alternatives may induce nuisance suits and
extortion of defendants to settle early, but notes that defendants may be required to litigate by their insurers and, in any
event, they can prolong a lawsuit so as to debase the value of
class recovery and to defeat the typically small firm that litigates class action suits.14 '
An article written after Judge Walker's initial opinion on

,3' Id. at 692.
Id. at 693.
'
1 Id. at 701-08.
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the Oracle litigation by Professors Jonathan R. Macey and
Geoffrey P. Miller of the University of Chicago Law School,
like Professor Coffee's, proposes an auctioning of the
claims.' A court would determine whether the case is appropriate for an auction by looking to whether many filings have
occurred, whether many claimants of individually small claims
exist and whether the claims are sufficiently concrete. A call
for sealed bids would ensue.'
The court would accept the
highest bidder and compensate the attorneys who filed the
claim but lost the auction.' The court then would distribute
the funds to the class. Litigation by the winning bidder against
the defendant would follow.
Professors Macey and Miller admit that their approach is
not without difficulties. "5 For one thing, in order to sell the
claim, it is important for it to be sufficiently defined at the
time of the auction. A second problem would occur if the bidders conspired to keep the bids as low as possible. Not only is
that likely considering how small the plaintiffs' bar is, but as
Professor Coffee also noted, the ability of defendants to participate in the auction exacerbates this possibility. The approach
would face another obstacle should there be too few bidders,
unless parties could conceive of a way to finance litigation
creatively. Other problems that must be considered with the
auction approach are insuring that the plaintiffs cooperate in
the litigation once their monetary interest in the claim is satisfied; compensating those who were the first to note the existence of the claim; problems with the jurisdictional reach of the
court if claims were filed in more than one district; and the
fact that the price of the suit would be brought out at trial by
the defendants. As did Professor Coffee, these authors admit
that their method may be unworkable and that the best reform
may come from retooling the system instead of drastically
46
altering it.
The current system also could benefit from an increase in
the use of court advisors, suggest Professors Macey and Miller.
Macey & Miller, supra note 47, at 106-16.
The bidders need not be law firms. Id. at 107.
" The authors assert that this solves the problems with the approach as described by Professor Coffee. Id. at 106 n.324.
'
Id. at 110-16.
14 Id. at 110 n.330.
1

"

19941

IN RE ORACLE SECURITIES LITIGATION

1701

In order to compensate for the inability of the court and the
class to evaluate properly the fee award, the court could select
47
a guardian to monitor settlement negotiations. The authors
note that, while a guardian may be manipulated by a bench
eager for settlement, the position nonetheless would be valuable because it would insure that the absent class was accounted for and that the class receives fair recovery.' To solve the
problem of the court's need to scrutinize fee petitions under a
lodestar regime, Professors Macey and Miller suggest using
either experts to determine their worth or special masters to
make controlling findings as to the reasonableness of the
fee. 44 A percentage method, notes the authors, eliminates the
need to calculate a fee, and is preferable to the lodestar system, but does over-compensate plaintiffs' attorneys and has the
effect of discouraging suits of merit when counsel could not
expect to achieve recompense. 5
In taking note of Judge Walker's efforts, Professors Macey
and Miller note that his formulation of the auction procedure
has the effect of "opening up the market for plaintiffs' attorneys and reducing the systematic overcompensation feature of
5
the percentage-of-the-recovery approach."' ' According to
these authors, however, the Oracle method may induce early
settlement by rewarding an earlier settlement with a higher
fee and disregards the skills and financial ability of the winning bidder.
2. A Proposal
Taking together the suggestions of Professors Coffee,
Macey and Miller, as well as the above discussion of the Oracle
opinion, the direction of attorney compensation systems choice
is unclear: either courts will continue to use the lodestar or
Id. at 47-48; see supra notes 77-80 & 90 and accompanying text.
.. However, the authors also note that compensation of guardians may also be
problematic, as one might imagine, if their fees were connected to the award.
Macey & Miller, supra note 47, at 48.
"' Id. at 57-58. The authors note that neither experts nor masters have been
regularly employed for this service. One drawback with the use of the master
would be her need to be fully acquainted with the litigation.
15o Counsel would not be compensated, if for instance, the expenses of litigation
were high, but recovery to the class low. Id. at 60; see supra notes 48-60.
...Macey & Miller, supra note 47, at 113.
147
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percentage methods with modifications or they will employ
some kind of auction, which, in the end, runs into many of the
same problems as the other methods. Thus, the only alternative is to develop a system that addresses the problems raised
by the Oracle bidding method.
The following solutions are required for a successful and
fair operation of the Oracle bidding method. The court must:
(1) insure that the position of lead counsel is awarded to qualified counsel; (2) demand bids fashioned on a sliding scale percentage that would decrease if the recovery to the class exceeded a certain limit and that would increase in proportion to the
amount of work envisioned, without any bonus for early settlement; 5 2 (3) prohibit expense caps in order for conflict with
the class to be truly avoided; and (4) consider plaintiffs' choice
of counsel.
In order for the auction approach to meet the second and
third suggestions, the court need only set guidelines for the
auction. On a certain level, when one considers that the Oracle
bidding procedure was the first of its kind, it seems unfair that
certain firms lost position of lead counsel in the Oracle litigation simply because their bids were not fashioned in accordance with a preconceived notion of the court. Moreover, it
may be difficult for the auction approach to produce the most
qualified attorney as the winning bidder; after all, auctions are
a creature of the business world and, in that context, the success of an auction bid is dependent only upon price. In addition, a winning bidder typically has a safety net in knowing
that she may breach the resulting contract if it is efficient to
s3

do so.1

152 The winning bid in Oracle, therefore, would have been a combination of the
Berger & Montague and Lowey bids. See supra notes 97 and 101 and accompanying text. This method was suggested by the Third Circuit task force in its effort
to find solutions to the lodestar dilemma. See supra note 48. The task force also
advocated a bonus for early settlement, but this feature creates a conflict between
counsel and the class by making settlement too attractive.
1"3 For a discussion of the auction and its problems, see generally E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1990). See also Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629
(1988) (discussing theory of efficient breach in terms of ex post renegotiation);
Daniel F. Spulber, Auctions and Contract Enforcement, 1990 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
325, 326 (noting that "the [aluction may unravel by failing to select the most
qualified firm" when a firm bids low, but finding that other incentives can prevent
breach).
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Similarly, it is hard to imagine that the auction approach
could ever consider the plaintiffs' choice of counsel. It is surprising that neither Judge Walker nor the commentators discuss this issue, but perhaps their omission is due to their belief
that the class, which does not exist before the court's certification, simply has no preference. However, aside from the fact
that some shareholders cared enough to seek out a particular
attorney and file a claim against the corporation, one can draw
the strong inference from the rise of shareholder activism in
recent years that today's shareholder also would care a great
deal about representation in a class suit." In the form of
auction implemented by Judge Walker in Oracle, the court
must consider plaintiffs' choice in choosing the best bid as
evidenced by the vote for lead counsel taken at a meeting of
the attorneys who represent the filing plaintiffs. This suggestion, however, cannot work if the court accepts bids for the
position of sole counsel for the class, as Judge Walker did in
seeking bids in connection with the claim against Oracle's
accountant, Arthur Andersen & Co. In such a situation, the
court ignores the retainer contracts that the named plaintiffs
have with their counsel.' If any named plaintiff wishes to
be included in the class, she will have to forego her agreement
with her attorney, since that attorney will not be entitled to
participate in the class action at all.' That choice is no

Nonetheless, the commentators' suggestion that an auction be open to any
buyer, including non-attorneys, would eliminate the dilemma of unqualified counsel
winning the bid, because once a party owns the lawsuit, it would be incumbent
upon her to choose the best attorney to represent her interests. See supra, notes
127-130. Under that system, the class is not a party to the litigation, thus the
court would have no obligation to monitor counsel quality.
I" The bulk of shareholders holding the majority of securities in public companies are large institutional investors, such as bank trust departments, mutual
funds and insurance companies. WMLMII L. CARY & IELVIN ARON EISENBERG,
CORPORATiONS 194-96 (6th ed. 1988). These investors long have fought for recognition as corporate owners, which has not only resulted in widespread acceptance of
that fact, but in favorable rulings from the SEC giving them greater power and
more access to information. Leslie Wayne, Have Shareholder Activists Lost Their
Edge?, N.Y. TimES, Jan. 30, 1994, at F7.
1" See supra notes 19 & 123 and accompanying text.
"' Under the Oracle auction method, if a named plaintiffs attorney was any
firm other than Lowey, Dannenberg, Bemporad & Seliger, the firm who had successfully bid for the position of lead counsel, plaintiff's firm still would have represented plaintiff by participating in the litigation under the supervision of lead
counsel. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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choice at all for a sophisticated investor who has carefully
chosen counsel for litigation.
CONCLUSION

It may be too soon to predict whether Judge Walker's
daring decision ultimately will change the current status of
compensating attorneys in common fund litigation. But the
time for fee competition in the courts has arrived. The country
is no longer in the spending mode of the 1980s, and disgruntled courts like those in the Ninth Circuit may demand that
parties engage in less expensive alternatives. Plaintiffs' attorneys may even begin to seek bidding procedures as more courts
become reluctant to enhance their fees under a lodestar regime. As shareholders increasingly file claims of securities
laws violations, they, too, are apt to become involved in the
litigation to monitor their ever-decreasing investments.
While no other court has yet to follow Judge Walker's lead,
at least three have taken note of his innovation. In Oregon, a
corporate defendant in a shareholder class-action suit opposed
plaintiffs' motion to establish lead counsel and petitioned the
district court judge to employ the competitive bidding process
to select lead counsel and predetermine their fees to defray
costs."5 7 In addition, two district judges in Illinois have championed the approach. When faced with the prospect of computing yet another complex lodestar calculation, District Judge
Shadur, in In re Telesphere International Securities Litigation,"8 made it clear that, were the court ever again faced
with a multiple class action suit, "as the sincerest form of flattery," it would "give serious consideration indeed to follow
Judge Walker's lead."5 " Similarly, District Judge Grady noted that the auction method is desirable in instances where
plaintiffs' counsel has bitterly fought for the position of lead
counsel because the court is then in a position to drive down

..
7 Cooperman v. Powell, Nos. 91-37-FR, 91-42-FR, 91-54-FR, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4941 (D. Or. Apr. 9, 1991).
...753 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ill. 1990).

159 Id. at 721 n.12. Judge Shadur reiterated support for the method in Davis v.
Coopers & Lybrand, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9196,461
(N.D. Ill. July 25, 1991).
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their fees.

161

While many are disillusioned by the current system, the
intricacy of awarding fees to counsel cannot be avoided in complex class action suits. Indeed, the real problem that courts
and commentators have with the system is not the complexity
of the fees systems currently in use, but rather their belief that
lawyers are reaping windfalls under these regimes. The public
is in agreement. When a judgment is high, as they tend to be
in securities litigation, coupled with relatively small awards to
the numerous individual plaintiffs, criticism of plaintiffs' attorneys is especially fashionable. While auctioning off the position of lead counsel has many problems, it will create competition among firms through which the best firms should emerge
and, accordingly, dissipate concerns over giving the contract to
the "lowest bidder."'6 '
Nanette L. Stasko

1

In re Continental Sec. Litig., 813 F. Supp. 633, 638-39 (N.D. Ill. 1993).

I' Wilford, supra note 1, at 25.

